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The Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series 
 
The Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series is produced by the Jean Monnet Chair of the 
University of Miami, in cooperation with the Miami European Union Center. 
 
These monographic papers address issues relevant to the ongoing European Convention which 
will conclude in the Spring of 2003.  The purpose of this Convention is to submit proposals for 
a new framework and process of restructuring the European Union.  While the European Union 
has been successful in many areas of integration for over fifty years, the European Union must 
take more modern challenges and concerns into consideration in an effort to continue to meet its 
objectives at home and abroad.  The main issues of this Convention are Europe’s role in the 
international community, the concerns of the European citizens, and the impending enlargement 
process.  In order for efficiency and progress to prevail, the institutions and decision-making 
processes must be revamped without jeopardizing the founding principles of this organization.  
During the Convention proceedings, the Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Papers will attempt to 
provide not only concrete information on current Convention issues but also analyze  various 
aspects of and actors involved in this unprecedented event. 
 
The following is a list of tentative topics for this series: 
 
1.  The challenges of the Convention: the ability to govern a supranational Europe or the return 
to intergovernmental cooperation? 
 
2.  How will the member states figure in the framework of the Convention? 
 
3.  The necessity to maintain a community method in a wider Europe. 
 
4.  Is it possible for the member states to jeopardize the results of the Convention? 
 
5.  The member states against Europe: the pressures on and warnings to the Convention by the 
European capitals. 
 
6.  Is it possible that the Convention will be a failure? The effects on European integration. 
 
7.  Similarities and differences between the European Convention and the Philadelphia 
Convention of 1787. 
 
8.  The role of a politically and economically integrated Europe in the governance of the world. 
 
9.  How important is European integration to the United States today? 
 
10.  The failure of a necessary partnership?  Do the United States and the European Union 
necessarily have to understand each other?  Under what conditions?  
 
11.  Is it possible to conceive a strategic partnership between the United States, the European 
Union and Russia? 
 
12.  Russia: a member of the European Union?  Who would be interested in this association? 
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NAFTA AND THE EUROPEAN REFERENT: LABOR MOBILITY IN 
EUROPEAN AND NORTH AMERICAN REGIONAL INTEGRATION 
 
 
 
The election of Vicente Fox in Mexico and of George W. Bush in the United States led 
to a short-lived bilateral “honeymoon” in 2001 that waned prior to the terrorist attacks 
of September 11, not after them.  One aspect of the honeymoon period involved 
recurrent allusions to a European referent for NAFTA in US and Mexican press 
coverage of a possible immigration policy initiative.  In several declarations, most 
notably President Fox’s speech at the Ottawa summit of the NAFTA partners in 2001, 
he spoke of his vision of a border-free North America where workers enjoyed freedom 
of movement.  The seeming European referent for NAFTA, then, was freedom of 
movement within the European space guaranteed European citizens under Articles 48 
and 49 of the Treaty of Rome. 
 
  If President Fox and other advocates of a US-Mexico immigration policy 
initiative actually espouse an Article 48-like freedom of labor mobility within NAFTA, 
they would appear to be overlooking fundamental differences between regional 
integration in North America and Europe.  We suggest that the Turkish-EU and 
Moroccan-EU relationships constitute a more appropriate European referent for 
NAFTA than Article 48.  Turkish and Moroccan bids for membership in the EC and EU 
failed for many reasons, but above all because of the prospect for large-scale emigration 
by Turks or Moroccans to other member-states long after the end of a transition period. 
 
Two Different Creatures 
 
The history of European federalism pre-dates World War II.  But the trauma of the 
Holocaust and the vast destruction of the two world wars convinced European leaders of 
a need for regional integration in order to prevent recurrence of war.  Subsequent 
regional integration in Europe was security-driven, and involved a European 
governance project.  While Europeans differed in their approaches to regional 
integration, the founders of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) launched 
a federalist project that was to evolve incrementally.  A vision of freedom of worker or 
employee mobility already informed the creation of the ECSC.1 
 
It is important to recall, however, that Italy’s strategy to facilitate emigration 
through regional integration encountered great resistance from other member-states.
2  
While the Treaty of Rome was signed in 1957, Article 48 did not become effective until 
1968.  In the meantime, Italy had undergone a remarkable transformation, in large part 
attributable to its membership in the European Community.  By the time Italians 
possessed freedom of labor mobility, they were little inclined to exercise the right.  
While Italians constituted the largest  group of intra-EC “community workers”, such 
                                                                   
1 A. Geddes, Immigration and European Integration: Towards Fortress Europe? (Manchester and NY: 
Manchester University Press, 2000), p. 45. 
2 F. Romero, “Migration as an Issue in European Interdependence and Integration: The Case of Italy,” in 
A. Milward, F. Lynch, R. Ranieri, F. Romero and V. Sørenson (eds.),  The Frontier of National 
Sovereignty (London: Routledge, 1993).  
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workers comprised a very tiny share of the combined workforce of the EC.
3  By 1990, 
the foreign resident population from other EU states had grown to over 5.5 million in a 
total population of 370 million, about 1.5 percent of the EU’s total population.4  The 
relative paucity of labor mobility between member-states of the EC and the EU 
contrasts strikingly with the current situation within the NAFTA area, where some eight 
to nine million Mexican-born individuals reside in the United States, about half 
illegally.  In 1972, there were only 750,000 Mexicans resident in the US. 
 
European regional integration largely involved the melding of societies at similar 
levels of socio-economic development.  The provision of deve lopment assistance to 
lagging areas within the European space helped narrow socio-economic disparities, in 
areas like Southern Italy which, in turn, reduced incentives for emigration under Article 
48.  Hence, the modest propensity to migrate for employment within the European 
space, while often decried, in fact reflects an underlying socio-economic reality that has 
a counterpart in the U.S.-Canadian relationship but not yet with Mexico. 
 
NAFTA emerged in a different historical context.  It was neither security-driven 
nor did it involve a federalist project.  Instead, it extended a free-trade area created in 
1988 between Canada and the United States in response to, in retrospect, exaggerated 
apprehensions over the trade implications of the Single European Act.  Indeed, it was 
these fears that gave rise to the notion of Fortress Europe, a term now inappropriately 
used to characterize EU-area migration policies.  The origins of NAFTA can be traced 
to the creation of the  Commission for the Study of International Migration and 
Cooperative Economic Development (CSIMCED) authorized by the Immigration 
Reform and Control Act of 1986.  Essentially, CSIMCED examined alternative or 
complementary strategies for prevention of illegal migration to the one found in IRCA.  
CSIMCED commissioned scores and scores of studies including one that examined the 
likely effects of trade liberalization between the U nited  States and Mexico upon the 
agricultural sector in Mexico and Mexican emigration.  It warned that trade 
liberalization would adversely affect the ejido sector of traditional small-scale farms 
which employed millions of Mexicans and which sustained one third of the M exican 
population.5  Philip L. Martin would later refine his insights into a theory of a migration 
hump in which emigration from Mexico to the U nited  States would increase 
significantly over the short to medium term before eventually declining over the long 
term in a scenario of trade liberalization.
6 
 
President Salinas of Mexico proposed NAFTA  to President George Bush, 
Senior.  The American president then referred the question to his National Security 
Council, which supported the proposal on the grounds that the U nited States and 
Mexico had become so interdependent, in large part due to migration, that untoward 
developments in Mexico would adversely affect the United States. 
 
                                                                   
3 H. Werner,  Freizügigkeit der Arbeitskräfte und die Wanderungsbewegungen in den Ländern der 
Europäischen Gemeinschaft (Nuremburg: Institut für Arbeitsmarkt-und Berufsforschung, 2000). 
4 R. Koslowski, Migrants and Citizens (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000), p. 118.   
5 P.L. Martin, Trade and Migration: NAFTA and Agriculture (Washington, DC: Institute for International 
Economics, 1993).  
6 P.L Martin and J.E. Taylor, “Managing Migration: The Role of Economic Policies,” in A. Zolberg and 
P. Benda, Global Migrants, Global Refugees (NY: Berghahn Books, 2001).  
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Hence, security concerns figured in the Bush administration’s embrace of the 
NAFTA concept, but much less centrally than in the European regional integration 
context.  Moreover, the NAFTA proposal involved no explicit political project as in the 
European context.  NAFTA would deepen socio-economic interdependence between the 
three partner states but all three jealously guarded their sovereign prerogatives.  Indeed, 
so sharp were differences between the United States and Mexico over illegal migration 
that a decision was made to exclude the “poison pill” of migration from NAFTA 
negotiations.  Paradoxically, then, only one minor formal clause of the NAFTA treaty 
pertains to migration while, in fact, migration control concerns figured centrally in the 
diplomatic initiative.  Indeed, both President Salinas and President Clinton would argue 
in support of signature and ratification of the NAFTA treaty that it would reduce illegal 
Mexican migration to the United  States.  To paraphrase President Salinas, either the 
United States would get Mexican tomatoes or Mexican workers. 
 
A decade after the signing of the NAFTA treaty, Mexican immigration to the 
United  States is surging.  Preliminary analysis of the 2000 census suggests that the 
proportion of illegal entrants among Mexican migrants to the U nited  States has 
increased significantly.  The downward slope in the expected hump has yet to 
materialize although there are Mexican experts who contend that changing demographic 
and socio-economic realities in Mexico will result in decreasing Mexican emigration to 
the United States soon. 
 
In retrospect, Article 48-like freedom of movement with the NAFTA area can at 
best be termed visionary.  There are those who view socio-economic integration as 
mechanistically or inevitably leading to spillover and deeper political integration 
between governments involved in a regional integration process.  However, it took the 
German Question, the resultant commitment to regional integration to prevent 
recurrence of war and a federalist project for such an outcome to materialize in the 
European regional integration context.  Leadership or volitional variables mattered a 
great deal in the development of the EU.  The unilateralist, even imperialist, dimensions 
of U.S. foreign policy under George W. Bush stand in sharp contrast. 
 
Moreover, NAFTA differs from the European regional integration process 
because the United States so dwarfs Mexico economically.  The difficulties encountered 
by African regional integration projects like the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS) in this respect are telling.  Rather than socio-economic integration 
resulting in deeper political integration and freedom of labor movement, mass 
deportations of community workers frequently result as in the Nigerian mass expulsions 
of the 1980s.
7  Aderanti Andepoju has identified the socio-economic predominance of 
one member state in multi-state regional integration frameworks as a recurrent obstacle 
to successful regional integration in Africa.  Typically, the richest state in a regional 
integration project absorbs most of the labor movement within the region which 
eventually leads to political frictions, conflicts and mass expulsions, especially in 
periods of economic recessions, such as experienced by Nigeria when oil prices 
plummeted and governmental instability increased.
8 
                                                                   
7 S. Ricca, Migrations internationals en Afrique (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1990). 
8 Anderanti Andepoju, “Regional Integration, Continuity and Changing Patterns of Intra-Regional 
Migration in Sub-Saharan Afirca,” in M.A.B. Siddique, ed., International Migration into the 21 st Century 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2001).  
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Few recall today that a mass repatriation of Mexicans living in the U nited States 
occurred in the 1930s and that Operation Wetback in 1954 resulted in the manu militari 
deportation of one million Mexicans.  Mexican apprehensiveness over interpretation of 
President George W. Bush’s interview with the Copely News Service in March 2003, in 
this respect, does not appear unwarranted.  Regional integration within NAFTA does 
not ensure an outcome similar to freedom of movement for European citizens. 
 
Are there other Possible Referents for NAFTA? 
The cases of Italy, Spain,  Portugal and Greece in European regional integration seem 
germane when contemplating possible European referents for NAFTA.  Instead of 
focusing on the extension of freedom of movement to Italian workers under Article 48, 
which came grudgingly and, for the Italian government, belatedly, Mexico and the 
United  States would do well to focus on how European Community investments in 
infrastructure and development in the Mezzogiorno helped attenuate international 
migration.  Instead of haggling over expanded admissions of temporary Mexican 
workers to the United  States, which after all would signify a regression to  a much-
decried bracero policy, would not it make more sense for the United States and Mexico 
to focus on infrastructural investments likely to foster Mexico’s socio-economic 
development? 
 
Foreign assistance has a bad reputation within the Beltway and most U .S. 
citizens have very mistaken notions about how much foreign aid the United States 
provides.  Undoubtedly, some of the hostility to U.S. foreign assistance arises from the 
way that it has been allocated in recent years- mainly to Israel and Egypt and much of it 
in the form of military and tied assistance.  Public opinion polling, however, 
consistently finds the general public to be supportive of generous US foreign assistance.  
The George W. Bush administration’s rejection  of Kofi Annan’s initiative at Monterey 
thus  amounted to a classic volte-face.  However the grudging acceptance by the 
Administration to increase U.S. foreign aid as part of a global strategy to alleviate the 
roots of terrorism may signal an impor tant departure.9 
 
Spain, Portugal and, to a lesser extent, Greece also might be viewed as referents.  
Spain and Portugal underwent a remarkable transition from lands of emigration to lands 
of immigration during the period that roughly coincided with  their accession to full 
membership.  The prospect of Iberian membership prompted a debate eerily reminiscent 
of the 2000-2001 debate over the migratory consequences of Poland’s entry into the 
EU.10  Some feared a tidal wave of Spanish and Portuguese emigration to other EU 
member-states after the completion of the transition period.  More lucid voices pointed 
to the lessons of the Italian precedent and, it turned out, they were right.  Spain and 
Portugal retained huge expatriate populations in the aftermath of full membership but no 
tidal wave of new Spanish and Portuguese community workers materialized.  To 
paraphrase Ray Koslowski, intra-European capital mobility substituted for intra-
European labor mobility.11  Between the onset of negotiations over Iberian  accession 
and completion of the transition period, Spain and Portugal underwent a significant 
                                                                   
9 B. Crossette, “Annan says Terrorism Roots are Broader than Poverty,” New York Times, March 7, 2002. 
10 E. Hönekopp and H. Werner, “Is the EU’s Labour Market Threatened by a Wave of Immigration?” 
Intereconomics, January 1, February, 3-8, 2000. 
11 Koslowski, p. 17.  
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socio-economic transformation, linked in large part to the prospect of EU membership.  
Changing Iberian demographic realities also helped foster change.  Spain in particular 
underwent a migration transition in the 1980s and 1990s that was roughly analogous to 
the migration transition in Italy in the 1970s. 
 
There are indications that Mexico has begun to undergo migration transition.  
Most migration to Mexico remains transit migration.  But migrant populations have 
long contributed to the labor force of certain regions of Mexico, such as Chiapas, and 
recent legalization policies undertaken by the Mexican government acknowledged an 
insufficiently understood aspect of Mexican society. 
 
Mexico’s status as a land of both emigration, transit migration and of 
immigration is far from unusual, indeed such status is increasingly the global norm.  
Recognition of that multi-faceted reality has become a more important factor in U.S.-
Mexico dialogue over migration issues in the wake of September 11.  Some have called 
for a hemispheric or at least NAFTA area defense perimeter in which immigration 
policies are harmonized in a way analogous to on-going EU efforts to negotiate a 
common immigration policy.  Mexico apparently has sought to link its cooperation with 
such a strategy to U.S. initiatives concerning illegally resident Mexicans in the United 
States. 
 
Leaving aside Portugal and Greece for reasons of parsimony, Spain’s 
incorporation into the Schengen space constituted a sine qua non for its accession.  As 
soon as Schengen rules applied, notably the imposition of visa requirements on 
Moroccans, the first pateras transporting illegal Moroccans and Black Africans arrived 
on Spain’s coasts.  In the 1990s, migratory pressures upon Spain appeared to intensify, 
perhaps spurred on by Spain’s recurrent legalization policies and authorization of small-
scale temporary foreign worker recruitment.  By late 2001, an association representing 
Moroccans in Spain estimated that some 4,000 Moroccans alone had perished seeking 
to enter Spain in the previous five years.  Such figures, of course, are notoriously 
difficult to substantiate but they provide some measure of the passion evoked by Spain’s 
immi gration dilemmas in recent years.12 The currently ruling conservative government 
has subsequently repudiated legalization policy and has infuriated Morocco with its 
proposals adopted at the Tampere EU summit, which seek to encourage Morocco to 
impose visa requirements on many Sub-Saharan African countries in order to stem 
transit migration through Morocco to Spain. 
 
There is much for both Mexicans and Americans to mull over on the possible 
referent to Spain.  In terms of much analyzed specific policies that  have been endlessly 
debated in the U.S.-Mexico context, recent experiences in Spain seem to confirm the 
conventional wisdom.  Legalization policies offer humanitarian relief to illegally 
resident aliens but do nothing to alter illegal migration dynamics.
13   Indeed, they 
probably serve to attract additional illegal migration.  Temporary foreign worker 
admissions policies are difficult to administer and often become “back door” 
legalization policies and probably also serve to increase illegal migration.  The United 
                                                                   
12 A. Belguendouz, “La Dimension Migratoire Maroco-Hispano-Européenne: Quelle Cooperation?” in A 
New Security Agenda for Future Regional Co-operation in the Mediterranean Region  (Rome: Fourth 
Mediterranean Dialogue International Research Seminar, NATO Defense College, November 2001).  
13 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Combating the Illegal Employment 
of Foreign Workers (Paris: OECD, 2000).  
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States and Mexico should examine specific instruments or policies implemented by 
Spain very closely, because these policies appear to have aggravated rather than 
alleviated illegal migration. 
 
The germaneness of Morocco, and by extension Tunisia and Algeria, to NAFTA 
zone migration policy is suggested by commonplace reference to the partnership 
agreements of recent years as EU mini-NAFTA pacts.  Indeed, the signature of NAFTA 
appears to have had what Reinhard Bendix termed a “demonstration effect” upon the 
EU and its North African partners.  The partnership agreements created free trade areas 
and foresaw cooperation on migration policies matters, particularly to reduce illegal 
migration. 
 
Morocco had  a long track record of cooperation with European states, 
particularly with France, on bilateral migration matters.  Despite the partnership pact 
with the EU, Moroccan-Spain and Moroccan-EU tensions have increased.  Migration 
regulation is only one of several fractious issues, but it may be the most significant.  
Interestingly, Morocco has come to embrace notions that closely parallel Mexico’s 
official views in bilateral negotiations with the United  States over Mexican migration.  
Specifically, Morocco views illegal emigration to the EU space as labor market-driven, 
essentially a response to unmet employer demand.  EU member-states such as Spain, 
like the United  States, view illegal migration as violations of law.  Morocco regards 
migrant integration and initiatives against discrimination as priorities for Spain and the 
EU, not prevention of illegal migration. 
 
The worsening state of Morocco-EU relations in recent years seems to contrast 
sharply with the direction of U.S.-Mexico relations.  But appearances can be deceiving 
and the historically antagonistic U .S.-Mexico relationship, particularly over bilateral 
migration issues, may well resume as the afterglow of the honeymoon period fades.  For 
all the transatlantic contextual differences, Morocco and Mexico find themselves in 
quite analogous situations.  The likely effects of the partnership agreements upon 
emigration from North Africa will probably parallel the migration hump foreseen for 
migration in the U.S.-Mexico trade liberalization scenario.14 
 
Turkey’s relationship to European regional integration differs greatly from that 
of North African countries.  Turkey acceded to EC association status in 1972, a step 
then understood as foreshadowing eventual full membership.  Turkish citizens comprise 
the largest population of third country nationals within the EU space, totaling over three 
million, with the more than two million Moroccans in the EU next in line.  Turkey now 
comprises a customs union with the EU but has repeatedly seen its bids for full 
membership in the EU rebuffed despite strong U.S. pressure upon EU member-states in 
support of Turkey’s accession.  Long-standing U .S. support for Turkey’s full 
membership has complicated U .S.-EU  relations and amounts, as Joaquín Roy has 
suggested, to U.S. meddling in the internal affairs of the European Union. 
 
The U.S. advocacy ignores a multitude of problems and issues which stand in 
the way of Turkish full membership.  There is no need here to elaborate upon those 
many problems and issues as they have been ably analyzed elsewhere.
15  Suffice it to 
                                                                   
14 G. White, “Encouraging Unwanted Immigration: A Political Economy of Europe’s Efforts to 
Discourage North African Immigration,” Third World Quarterly, 20:4, 1999. 
15 B. Buzan and T. Diez, “The European Union and Turkey,” Survival, Vol. 41, Spring 1999.  
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note here that a key dimension of the bundle of problems and issues standing in the way 
is the prospect for unacceptably high levels of Turkish emigration after the completion 
of a transition period.  Such a scenario is politically unpalatable to most EU member 
states despite the looming demographic declines in countries like Germany, Spain and 
Italy.  This constitutes a key reason why the horizon for Turkey’s full membership 
remains remote and distant but still possible. 
 
Currently, Turkey like Morocco is coming under considerable pressure to 
harmonize its immigration policies with those of the EU.  For instance, Turkey’s 
refugee law and policy recently changed with Turkey discontinuing the long established 
practice of granting preferential entry to ethnic Turks from former Ottoman lands.  
Turkey is also contemplating imposition of employer sanctions and reform of its 
policies towards asylum seekers.
16  These proposed changes could be quite significant 
as Turkey has long tolerated the presence of three to four million aliens, most of whom 
hail from nearby countries like Iran and Iraq.  If Turkey were to alter its de facto policy 
of toleration, and thereby more closely approximate public policies in the EU area, there 
could be significant repercussions upon a region already confronting politically 
destabilizing population movements, such as the massive inflow of Iraqis to Jordan. 
 
Turkey’s relationship to the EU somewhat parallels Mexico’s to the U nited 
States, although the former involves a customs union while the latter a free trade 
agreement.  In both instances, the legacy of past temporary foreign worker recruitment 
policies weighs heavily.  That legacy mitigates against full membership for Turkey in 
the EU, turning on its head the unwarranted assumption that worker migration 
necessarily leads to deeper socioeconomic and political integration. 
 
Mexico continues to seek expanded admission of its citizens as temporary 
workers in the US and apparently would regard a return to  bracero-like policy as 
progress in the U .S.-Mexico bilateral relationship.  But the  bracero policy was 
terminated in 1964 for good reasons just as were guest worker policies in the 1972 to 
1974 period in Western Europe.  Temporary foreign worker recruitment policies in 
Europe and North America constituted flawed public policies that resulted in 
considerable unanticipated settlement and illegal migration.  There is no good reason to 
think that expanded admissions of temporary foreign workers from Mexico to the 
United States is going to hasten the day that President Fox’s vision of a border-free 
North America arrives.  The track record of temporary foreign worker admissions 
policies contributing to harmonious bilateral or regional relations is unpromising. 
 
Turkey, thus, may constitute a more relevant European referent for NAFTA.  As 
long as Turkey lags far behind the EU economically and long-term prospects for high 
rates of Turkish emigration remain, deeper integration with the EU through full 
membership will prove elusive.  When guest worker policies in Western Europe were 
curbed or stopped in the early 1970s, several million Turks were registered for 
recruitment.17  Some thirty years later, full membership for Turkey in the EU remains 
elusive, in part because of the perception that too many Turks would emigrate if granted 
freedom of labor mobility within the EU. 
 
                                                                   
16 OECD, Trends in International Migration (Paris: OECD, 2001), p. 254.  
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Comparing Labor Migration within NAFTA and the EU: A Research Agenda 
 
There have been a number of efforts to compare the European and North American 
migratory systems,  and policy-oriented transatlantic compa risons of international 
migration stretch back to the mid-1970s, if not earlier.  Yet important misapprehensions 
persist as attested to by unwarranted allusions to a European referent to NAFTA in the 
U.S.-Mexico immigration honeymoon period.  This suggests that much more work 
needs to be done by all concerned parties, including Americans. 
 
Migration issues can no longer be dismissed as peripheral or esoteric.  They 
vitally affect security, inclusive of that of migrants.  The United States does not seem to 
appreciate fully how European security concerns are related to the prevention of 
“unwanted” migration.  Transatlantic tensions over Iraq arise, in part, from differing 
perceptions of security threats.  The EU wants to stabilize the Middle East, the source o f 
so much immigration to the EU.  It understands that a likely consequence of further 
conflict in the Middle East will be greater pressure for emigration to the EU. 
 
The United States appears oblivious to the fears of its European allies, inclusive 
of Turkey.  Indeed, it appears to view the war with Iraq as possibly resulting in regime 
change and democratization.  It courts elements of the approximately four million 
expatriate Iraqis, out of a total population of some twenty-two million, to help bring 
about democratization. 
 
Meanwhile, Arab scholars and leaders warn of a war opening the proverbial jaws 
of hell.  Mass movement of people appears to figure centrally in this apocalyptic vision.  
Surely it is high time for transatlantic comparisons of immigration and migration 
policies to take their implications for security seriously, especially if war with Iraq 
increases the appeal of al-Qaida amongst Muslims in the transatlantic area, as seems 
predictable. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
17  P.L. Martin,  The Unfinished Story, Turkish Labour Migration to Western Europe (Geneva: 
International Labour Organization, 1991).    
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